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RESTAURANTS, BARS AND WORKPLACES, LEND
ME YOUR AIR: SMOKEFREE LAWS AS PRIVATE
PROPERTY EXACTIONS-THE UNDISCOVERED
COUNTRY FOR NOLLAN AND DOLAN?
Robert P. Hagan
A disturbing trend has developed in the United States that threatens
private property rights protected under the Fifth' and Fourteenth
2
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. Through the efforts of a powerful
anti-smoking movement3 responding to voluminous evidence linking
exposure to secondhand environmental tobacco smoke4 with a number of
* J.D. candidate, 2006, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
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1. The Fifth Amendment states in relevant part: ". . .nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend V.
2. The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the States by "incorporation" into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Haw. Housing Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 244 (1984); see also Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S.
825,827 (1987).
3. For a brief history and tactical strategy of the movement, see AMERICANS FOR
NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, RECIPE FOR A SMOKEFREE SOCIETY (May 1, 2003), http://www.no-
smoke.org/pdf/recipe.pdf.
4. Secondhand smoke, also called "environmental tobacco smoke," or ETS, is a
mixture of"sidestream smoke" emitted from a burning tobacco product and "mainstream
smoke" exhaled by a smoker. U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, THE
HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF INVOLUNTARY SMOKING 7 (1986) [hereinafter 1986 SURGEON
GENERAL REPORT]. There are roughly 250 toxic or carcinogenic chemicals in ETS.
Andrew Hyland et al., 7 City Air Monitoring Study (7CAM) 3, March-April 2004 (May
2004), http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/pressoffice/7camreport.pdf.
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health risks,5 several states and municipalities6 have passed one-hundred
percent smokefree laws or ordinances applicable to restaurants, bars and
workplaces.
7
5. The health effects of secondhand smoke are well-documented. See, e.g., 1986
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4; OFFICE OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL
ASSESSMENT, U.S. EPA, THE RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG
CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992). The EPA declared secondhand smoke a Group A
carcinogen, a designation reserved for those pollutants that have been shown to cause
cancer in humans. See U.S. EPA, FACT SHEET: RESPIRATORY HEALTH EFFECTS OF
PASSIVE SMOKING (1993), http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/pubs/etsfs.html. Studies have
also linked secondhand smoke to increased risk of coronary heart disease, stroke,
respiratory ailments and other cancers. See Action on Smoking and Health, Passive
Smoking: A Summary of the Evidence (May 2004),
http://www.ash.org.uk/html/passive/html/passive.html [hereinafter ASH Summary];
Smoke-Free Environments Law Project, The Health Effects of Environmental Tobacco
Smoke, http://www.tcsg.org/sfelp/health.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005) (linking to Peter
H. Whinicup et. al., Passive Smoking and Risk of Coronary Heart Disease and Stroke:
Prospective Study With Cotinine Measurement, BRITISH MED. J., June 30, 2004,
http://bmj.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/bmj.38146.427188.55vl). Some studies have
concluded that surprisingly low levels of exposure (as little as one-half hour) to
secondhand smoke can be potentially disastrous to one's cardiovascular system, see ASH
Summary, supra. The effects on children are also alarming: secondhand smoke has been
linked to increased risk of pneumonia, bronchitis, asthma, middle ear infection, SIDS,
stunted development of lung functions and spinal disorders later in life. See 1986
SURGEON GENERAL REPORT, supra note 4, at x-xi; ASH Summary, supra; AMERICANS
FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, SECONDHAND SMOKE: THE SCIENCE (Oct. 2004),
http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/SHS.pdf Exposure to secondhand smoke has been linked
to decreased cognitive abilities with respect to math, reading and logical reasoning. See
Press Release, Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, Environmental Tobacco
Smoke Linked to Reading, Math, Logic and Reasoning Declines in Children (Jan. 4,
2005), http://www.eurekalert.org/pubreleases/2005-01/cchm-ets122804.php. Exposure
to secondhand smoke has also been linked to miscarriage, exacerbation of cystic fibrosis
and meningitis. See ASH Summary, supra. Secondhand smoke exposure ranks third in
causes of preventable mortality in the United States annually. See AMERICANS FOR
NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, SECONDHAND SMOKE: THE SCIENCE, supra. In 1998, tobacco
manufacturers filed suit against the EPA seeking to invalidate portions of its 1993 study
due to faulty research methodologies. Today, even some tobacco companies have
acknowledged the dangers of secondhand smoke exposure. See, e.g., Philip Morris USA,
Health Issues, Secondhand Smoke, http://www.pmusa.com/health issues/secondhand_
smoke.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005). Others dispute the evidence. See, e.g., R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Company, Tobacco Issues, Secondhand Smoke,
http://www.rjrt.com/Tl/Tisecondhand-smoke.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
6. Smokefree laws are generally more successful at the local level because they
provide the best protection for nonsmokers. State statutes often aren't well enforced and
are misunderstood by the general populace. Local laws are also more effective because
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As of September 2005, 397 municipalities 8 and fourteen states9 have
adopted one-hundred percent smokefree coverage in at least one of these
three establishments.' 0 Absent any exemption in the statutory or regulatory
scheme, smoking is completely prohibited in the category of establishment
targeted. Bars and restaurants" are particularly targeted for regulation due to
the governing bodies of local municipalities are less likely to be influenced by tobacco
lobbyists and more attuned to their constituents than are state legislators. At the local
level, the laws are better enforced and better understood by the local population. See
AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERS (Jan. 2003),
http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/rights.pdf.
7. AMERICAN NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, OVERVIEW LIsT-How MANY
SMOKEFREE LAWS? (Jan. 4, 2005), http://www.nosmoke.org/pdf/mediaordlist.pdf.
8. This figure includes only those municipalities with 100% smokefree ordinances
in effect at the local level. The actual number of municipalities affected by 100%
smokefree bans in one of the three main categories is much higher, because any
municipality in a state that has enacted a 100% smokefree law is affected regardless of
whether a local ordinance has been passed. For a list of municipalities with local
ordinances, see AMERICAN NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, MUNICIPALITIES WITH
LOCAL, 100% SMOKEFREE LAWS (Jul. 7, 2005), http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/
100ordlisttabs.pdf.
9. AMERICAN NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, OVERVIEW LIST-How MANY
SMOKEFREE LAWS?, supra note 7. The fourteen states are: California (all three), CAL.
LAB. CODE § 6404.5 (West 2004); Connecticut (restaurants and bars), CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 19a-342(b)(l) (2004); Delaware (all three), DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2902-04 (2004);
Florida (workplaces and restaurants), FLA. STAT. ANN. § 386.204 (West 2004); Idaho
(restaurants), see IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-5502-5503 (2004); Maine (restaurants and
bars), ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1541-42 (2004); Massachusetts (all three), MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 270, § 22 (West 2004); Montana (workplaces and restaurants, bars
in 2009), MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 50-40-103, -04 (2005); New York (all three), N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 1399-0 (McKinney 2004); North Dakota (workplaces), N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 23-12-10 (2005); Rhode Island (all three), R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-20.10-3, -4 (2004);
South Dakota (workplaces), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-36-2(2004); Utah (restaurants),
UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-38-2, -3 (2004); Vermont (restaurants and bars), 2005 Vt. Acts &
Resolves 34 (repealing VT. STAT. ANN. tit 18, § 1744 (2005)). One-hundred ten
municipalities have 100% smokefree coverage in all three major categories. AMERICAN
NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, OVERVIEW LIST-How MANY SMOKEFREE LAWS?,
supra note 7.
10. The numbers are growing each year at the local level. See AMERICAN
NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS FOUNDATION, MUNICIPALITIES WITH LOCAL 100% SMOKEFREE
LAWS-CUMULATIVE NUMBER EFFECTIVE BY YEAR 1990-2005 (Jul. 7, 2005),
http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/ I00ordgraph.pdf.
11. Under many statutory schemes, bars attached to restaurants are treated as part of
the restaurant. If a state or municipality outlaws smoking in restaurants but not bars,
smoking in bars attached to restaurants will be prohibited. Smoking in freestanding, non-
attached bars will be permitted. Idaho is illustrative. Under Idaho law, smoking is
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the prevalence of secondhand smoke in such establishments. Secondhand
smoke levels in bars are 240-1850% higher than those in workplace smoking
environments, and restaurant smoke levels are 160-200% higher.'
2
Smokefree laws represent a major victory for anti-smoking activists, who
desire freedom to breathe clean air and avoid a health risk regardless of
where they work and where they socialize. 13 However, the implications are
grim for private property ownership. Restaurant and bar owners have
complained that the laws injure business by repelling smoking customers;14
to them, the laws are an unwarranted governmental intrusion adversely
affecting their profits.' 5 Private property rights are at the forefront of the
prohibited generally in "public places" subject to exceptions. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-
5503(l) (2004). "Public place" is defined to include, inter alia, restaurants. Id. at § 39-
5502(6)(c). Smoking is not prohibited, however, in bars. Id. at § 39-5503(1)(a). A "bar"
is defined as
any indoor area open to the public operated primarily for the sale and service of
alcoholic beverages for on-premises consumption and where: (a) the service of
food is incidental to the consumption of such beverages, or (b) no person under
the age of twenty-one (21) years is permitted except as provided in section 23-
943, Idaho Code, as it pertains to employees, musicians and singers, and all
public entrances are clearly posted with signs warning patrons that it is a
smoking facility and that persons under twenty-one (21) years of age are not
permitted. "Bar" does not include any area within a restaurant.
Id. at § 39-5502(2).
12. AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, SECONDHAND SMOKE: WORKER HEALTH
(2004), http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/shsworkerhealth.pdf.
13. Russell Sciandra, Law Protects Nonsmokers' Rights, BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 5,
2003, at H5.
14. Id. For an example of the opinions of what might be called a "typical" American
smoker, see Matt McCoy, Letter to the Editor, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 19,
2004, at 2Q. With the diminishing rights of smokers to be able to choose their vice, the
huddled masses outside offices and parking garages continue to grow. Like lepers
banished to a dismal corner to seek shelter from the rain, smokers find any safe haven in
order to be in a 'Designated Smoking Area.' One state, Delaware, has acknowledged the
rights of smokers and has attempted to strike a balance with its smokefree law. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2901(2004) (trying to "minimize unwarranted governmental
intrusion into and regulation of private sphere of conduct and choices").
15. See, e.g., Tim Rowden, Restaurant Owners Praise Accord on Smoking, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, JEFFERSON COUNTY POST, Sept. 20, 2004, at 01; Michelle Jacklin,
Editorial, Casinos Cloud State's Smoking Ban, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 11, 2004,
at A15 ("As proof of the alleged economic devastation wrought by the no smoking law,
[attorney Jan] Trendowski said one of the plaintiffs, Diane Batte-Holmgren, owner of
Nowhere Caf6 in New London, saw a decline in the number of cases of Budweiser sold
each week from 50 to 20."); Charles Yoo, 2-Stage Smoke Ban Urged, THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, METRO NEWS, September 17, 2004, at I D.
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assault, thus non-smokers too have entered the fray and criticized the
smokefree movement.
16
Governments have enacted smoking bans by using their police powers to
protect the health and safety of their citizens. States and local governments
maintain that their police power authorizes the enactment of smokefree laws
in an effort to prevent the onset of various debilitating and potentially fatal
diseases purportedly' 8 aggravated by environmental tobacco smoke. 19
However, whether the police power validates such legislation is far from a
settled question. It is axiomatic that any legislative enactment must pass
federal constitutional muster,20 but the constitutionality of smokefree laws
has not been resolved, regardless of their prevalence and popularity.
2 1
Legal challenges to smokefree laws abound, premised on numerous
theories of constitutional infirmity. 2 2 Four restaurant owners in Connecticut
16. See, e.g., JIM WATERS, BLUEGRASS INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY SOLUTIONS,
ZEALOTS BLOW SMOKE ON PROPERTY RIGHTS (2004), available at
http://www.bipps.org/pubs/Zealots.pdf; Tony Messenger, Price of Freedom Lost in Hazy
Cloud of Secondhand Smoke, COLUMBIA DAILY TRIBUNE, Dec. 1, 2004, available at
http://www.columbiatribune.com/2004/Dec/20041201Feat001.asp. On the takings issue,
the writer, a non-smoker, states:
Unless government commits to the same process that occurs when it takes a
person's land so it can build a new highway - reasonable compensation
determined by the market - this movement to ban smoking in private businesses
that make their living on folks who want to come in and have a beer and a
cigarette is an unconstitutional taking.
Id.
17. See, e.g., Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951); H.P. Hood &
Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949).
18. The science is still open to dispute. See, e.g., Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop.
Stabilization Corp. v. United States EPA, 4 F. Supp. 2d 435 (M.D.N.C. 1998), vacated,
313 F.3d 852 (4th Cir. 2002); James E. Enstrom & Geoffrey C. Kabat, Environmental
Tobacco Smoke and Tobacco Related Mortality in a Prospective Study of Californians,
1960-98, BRITISH MED. J. (May 17, 2003), http:/Ibmj.bmjjoumals.com/cgi/content/full/
326/7398/1057; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Tobacco Issues, Secondhand Smoke,
http://www.rjrt.com/TI!Tisecondhandsmoke.asp (last visited February 14, 2005).
19. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5501 (2004) and DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
2901 (2005).
20. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 399 (1798) (Iredell, J. dissenting).
21. See AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, PATRON SURVEYS AND CONSUMER
BEHAVIOR (May 2005), http://www.nosmoke.org/pdf/patronsurveys.pdf.
22. Where a ban is in place, the interests of nonsmokers are served fully and
challenges arise from business owners and smokers. Where there are no laws in effect,
nonsmokers have brought legal challenges of their own premised on different theories.
Some have argued that injury from second-hand smoke is a basis for workers
compensation. See, e.g., Johannesen v. New York City Dept. of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 638
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recently filed suit in state court alleging violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Connecticut's ban does not
apply to Indian casinos or private clubs. 23 In another case, the Fraternal
Order of Eagles sued the city of Marlboro, the Board of Health and its
members, alleging interference with private property rights and violations of
the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion and right to
assemble.24 The Empire State Restaurant and Tavern Association challenged
New York's smoking ban as unconstitutionally vague and preempted by• 25
federal law, arguments which were rejected by a U.S. district court judge.
One emerging26 constitutional avenue for restaurant and bar owners is a
federal law challenge predicated on the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.
27
In relevant part, the Fifth Amendment guarantees "nor shall private property
be taken for public use, without just compensation."2 8 A long line of
Supreme Court case law has extended the applicability of the Takings
Clause beyond the exercise of eminent domain 29 to certain statutes and
N.E.2d 981 (N.Y. 1994); negligence claims, see, e.g., McCarthy v. Dept. of Soc. &
Health Serv., 759 P.2d 351 (Wash. 1988); disability benefits, see, e.g., Parodi v. Merit
Sys. Prot. Bd., 702 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1982); and emotional distress claims, see, e.g.,
Carroll v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 697 F. Supp. 508(D. D.C. 1998) among other claims.
Other plaintiffs have alleged that sensitivity to second-hand smoke can be a basis for a
claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see, e.g., Bell v. Elmhurst Chicago
Stone Co., 919 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Ill. 1996) and Bond v. Sheahan, 152 F. Supp. 2d
1055 (N.D. 111. 2001). See AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF
NONSMOKERS, supra note 6.
23. Jacklin, supra note 15, at A15. The suit was dismissed at the trial level. See
Christopher Keating, Judge Upholds Ban on Smoking, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 9,
2004, at B I.
24. Scott J. Croteau, Eagles Sue Over Ban on Smoking, WORCESTER TELEGRAM &
GAZETTE, ROUTE 9 E. EDITION, Jul. 8, 2004, at B 1.
25. John Caher, New York State's Smoking Ban Wins Round in Federal Challenge,
230 N.Y.L.J. No. 80, 1 (2003).
26. Takings challenges to smokefree laws are in their infancy. No court has yet
struck down a smokefree law as an impermissible taking. See AMERICANS FOR
NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, LEGAL CHALLENGES TO SMOKEFREE INDOOR AIR ORDINANCES
(Aug. 2004), http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/LegalChallenges.pdf; see, e.g., City of
Tucson v. Grezaffi, 23 P.3d 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo,
393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005); Helena Partnership, LLP v. City of Helena, No. BVD-
2002-420, 2003 Mont. Dist. LEXIS 1844 (Dist. Ct. Mont., Jan. 7, 2003).
27. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987).
28. U.S. Const. amend V.
29. Eminent domain is "the inherent power of a governmental entity to take privately
owned property, especially land, and convert it to public use, subject to reasonable
compensation for the taking." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 562 (8th ed. 2004).
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regulations that "work" the effect of a taking even in the absence of any
physical occupation or appropriation of the property by the governmental
authority.
30
In 1987, the Supreme Court further extended the Takings Clause to cover
situations in which the government demands an exaction (also known as a
"dedication") of a portion of property for a public use as a condition for the
owner to obtain a permit for a desired private use. 31 Though the Takings
Clause now sweeps broadly, standards of judicial review differ remarkably
depending on the taking's nature.
While business owners who challenge smoking bans are not suffering
physical occupations of their property, they may still argue that smokefree
laws constitute impermissible regulatory takings. The government may
properly interfere with property rights so as to effect a taking, but the Fifth
Amendment guarantees that such a taking requires the government to
compensate the property owner.32  Smokefree laws work impermissible
takings of property precisely because they fail to provide just
compensation. 33 The argument is not merely academic curiosity or reserved
for daring litigators - at least one state legislature has attempted to give such
an argument vitality within a statutory scheme protecting private property
from regulatory takings.
34
This comment suggests that an as-applied challenge to a smokefree law
based on a theory of an impermissible regulatory taking is a viable option for
affected business owners. While a challenge under the deferential standard
announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City35 is
unlikely to succeed, a suit could be successful if framed as an exaction case
meriting the heightened judicial scrutiny applied in the Nollan v. California
30. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 122-28 (1978)
(emphasis added). See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1014 (1992) ("'while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too
far it will be recognized as a taking."') (quoting Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,
415 (1922)).
31. Nollan, 483 U.S. 825.
32. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 315 (1987).
33. The goal of just compensation is to return the injured party to the status quo.
"The Supreme Court defines just compensation as 'the full monetary equivalent of the
property taken. The owner is to be put in the same position monetarily as he would have
occupied if his property had not been taken."' Bryan C. Goldstein, Case Comment,
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation: The Future of IOLTA, 79 B.U. L. Rev. 1277,
1291 (1999) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970)).
34. See H.B. 2833, 79th Leg. (Tex. 2005) (last action May 22, 2005).
35. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 127 (suggesting that a land use regulation need only be
"reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial public purpose").
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Coastal Commission 36 and Dolan v. City of Tigarc 7 decisions. A takings
challenge sends a clear message: if government wants to burden owners
economically by interfering with the operations of a privately-owned
establishment, it must pay to do so. Furthermore, there are alternative
constitutional means with which states may achieve the ends of smokefree
legislation apart from mandatory smoking bans.
This comment is organized in three sections. Part I will discuss the
various frameworks for takings analyses informing Supreme Court takings
jurisprudence. Part II will analyze smokefree laws as applied to restaurants
and bars under the various frameworks identified in takings case law and
argue that as-applied to certain restaurant and bar owners, they amount to
uncompensated and therefore unconstitutional takings. Part Ill will provide
alternative proposals for initiatives that stop short of affirmative bans but
achieve the same goals of protecting nonsmokers' rights while withstanding
constitutional scrutiny.
1. AN OVERVIEW OF PROPERTY AND TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
The Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment requires the
government to provide the private 38 property owner with just compensation
if it takes his property for public use. 3While the text of the Constitution
implicates the government's exercise of eminent domain or physical
appropriation of private property, the Supreme Court has extended its reach
40to regulatory takings, wherein a statute or regulation operates so as to
effect a taking of property. An exaction is a special form of regulatory taking
in which a desired use of property is conditioned on a dedication of some
41
interest in the property for a public use.
36. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 (explaining the "essential nexus" test).
37. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994) (explaining the "rough
proportionality" test).
38. Sheldon Richman takes issues with labeling restaurants, for example, as "public"
places. They are public accommodations, or open to the public, but they are not true
public places in the sense of being owned by the state and funded by the taxpayers. His
preferred term is "commercial property," connoting private property open to the public.
See Cato Policy Report, Do Smokers Have Rights? The Science and Politics of Tobacco,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/policyreport/smoke-pr.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
Perhaps the status of the restaurants and bars as public accommodations has muted the
reality that such establishments are actually private property whose owners grant the
public the privilege of entering at certain times for a certain purpose. If so, this may
contribute to the dearth of takings challenges in this area.
39. U.S. Const. amend V.
40. See, e.g., Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
41. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
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"The straightforward purpose of the Takings Clause," writes leading
constitutional law scholar and commentator Professor Douglas Kmiec, "is to
avoid the disproportionate placement of public burdens upon a single
property owner. ' ' 2 Inherent in the clause is an implicit struggle between
state police power to protect the health, safety and welfare of the citizenry
and private property interests.43
"Property" itself is a concept admitting no simple definition. It contains
both positive and natural law components and predates government,
meaning the term is not solely derived from legislative exercise of power.
44
At the time of the nation's founding, the Framers relied on Sir William
Blackstone's conception of property as a claim over an external thing to the
exclusion of all others in the universe.45 This right to exclude is one of the
"bundle of rights" 46 held in a private property interest and is arguably the
most essential right.4 7 Originally, the concept of common law private
property flowed from nuisance law: one could use his property in any way
he desired, so long as he did not injure others. 48 The connection between
private property and nuisance law constructs property as a balance between
competing public and private rights. 49 There is no federalized or
constitutionalized conception of property. The Supreme Court instead has
adopted a concept that defines property and police power "reciprocally in
relation to a state's background principles of property law, especially the
common law of nuisance." 50 Given the obtuse and amorphous nature of
42. Douglas W. Kmiec, Defining Takings: Private Property and the Future of
Government Regulation: Inserting the Last Remaining Pieces Into the Takings Puzzle, 38
WM. AND MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1997).
43. Id.
44. Id.at 999-1000.
45. Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is Neither
Weak Nor Obtuse, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1630, 1635 (1988).
46. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 142-43 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("'Property'... 'denote[s] the group of rights inhering in the
citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and dispose of it...The
constitutional provision is addressed to every sort of interest the citizen may possess."')
(internal citations omitted).
47. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm., 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987).
48. Kmiec, The Original Understanding, supra note 45, at 1635, 1639.
49. Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and
the New Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265, 275 (1996). The rights of
neighboring property owners were traditionally vindicated through nuisance or trespass
actions while the rights of the public writ large were handled through the State's exercise
of its police power.
50. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 1002. Professor Kmiec suggests that
courts should not attempt to define these background principles. The states are bound by
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property, the chosen regime is not inevitable. However, it is the framework
on which takings analysis is based.51
The Fifth Amendment prevents the possibility that property may be taken
for a purely private use, "without a justifying public purpose, even though
compensation is paid. ' '53 Public use does not require that the property
actually be used by or enjoyed by the general public.54 Such use has been
interpreted broadly to be "coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police
powers. 55 Whatever the sovereign deems as public use is legitimate. Under
the notion of sic utere enshrined in common-law nuisance, subject to legislative nuances.
"Within the borders set by the common law of nuisance, and reasonable statutory
extensions thereof, common law ownership includes rights of possession, exclusion, use,
profit, and disposition or transfer." Id. at 1002 n.33.
51. Professor Kmiec notes that there are competing definitions of private property to
that employed by the Court. Private property could be conceived as deriving entirely
from legislative enactments, sacrificing the individual to majoritarian rule and
obliterating any distinction between harms and benefits (a dichotomy for nuisance law).
Alternatively, property could be conceived of as sacrosanct and absolute, admitting of no
authority by the state to prevent any use whatsoever. For Kmiec, "fixing upon a
conception of property that gets the distinction between harm and benefit off the ground
in a manner consistent with the constitutional aim of insulating individual citizens from
arbitrary or disproportionately burdensome exercises of governmental power, but which
does not deny the existence of that power..." is key. Kmiec, The Original Understanding,
supra note 45, at 1640.
52. The distinction between public and private use has been eviscerated by the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Kelo v. City of New London. 545 U.S. , 125 S. Ct.
2655 (2005). In Kelo, the Court held that condemnation and transfer of private land to
another private party satisfied the public use requirement because the land was to be
developed for the benefit of the area in the form of new jobs and increased tax revenue.
The Court deferred to the city's determination that its economic development plan served
a public purpose and refused to hold, as petitioners urged, that economic development
does not qualify as public use. Id. at 2665-66. Dissenting, Justice O'Connor chastised the
Court for expanding the meaning of public use to essentially sanction private takings:
"[The Court] holds that the sovereign may take private property currently put to ordinary
private use, and give it over for new, ordinary private use, so long as the new use is
predicted to generate some secondary benefit for the public...." Id. at 2675 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Justice O'Connor went on to say that since a standard of predicted beneficial
side-effects is required rather than proof of direct public use or benefit was applied, "for
public use" is rendered superfluous.
53. Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984) (citing Thompson v.
Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)).
54. Id. at 244.
55. Id. at 240.
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separation of powers principles, courts must defer to the legislature's
determination unless it lacks a reasonable foundation.
56
Regulatory takings law is confusing and inconsistent,57 but the weight of
the case law yields a few key principles for different factual settings.
58
Regulatory takings jurisprudence was born in Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,
where Justice Holmes remarked that "the general rule at least is, that while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
will be recognized as a taking." 59 Holmes did not elaborate on this
proposition, but left it to future courts to determine when the line is crossed
from mere regulation to compensable taking. In grappling with this question,
the Court has employed "[essentially] ad hoc, factual inquiries."
60
Regulatory takings cases can be grouped into four categories. The first
three involve the application of a regulation. A regulation can result in a
physical occupation, a partial non-physical taking, or a total non-physical
taking. The last category is exactions, the imposition of a condition on a
desired use of property.
A. Regulation resulting in physical occupation
In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., the Supreme Court
held that the government must compensate the property owner for a physical
occupation of a recognized property interest, no matter how minor the
61intrusion. If the occupation is physical, there is no inquiry into the public
62interest served. This result is grounded in the Blackstonian concept of
property as an absolute right to exclude others and it "reminded the Court
that no matter how high-minded the justifications for a public regulatory
scheme might be, in a democratic republic with a natural law foundation, the
56. 1d. at 241.
57. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 995-96. Professor Kmiec refers to
takings jurisprudence as a puzzle. Id.
58. The present discussion will not include an analysis of eminent domain but will
rather be confined to regulatory takings, since smoking bans do not involve the exercise
of eminent domain powers.
59. Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Without defining it, Holmes was
drawing a line between legitimate exercise of police power and a taking for which just
compensation is due. See Smith v. Town of Mendon, 822 N.E.2d 1214, 1226 (N.Y. 2004)
(Read, J., dissenting).
60. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
61. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(requiring compensation to property owners who were forced to allow New York cable
company to insert cable apparatus in building).
62. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). See also Tahoe-
Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).
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objective reality of privately-held property resources limits those
schemes."63 As long as a regulation produces a physical occupation, private
property interests trump governmental justifications.
A physical occupation need not be static and attached to the property for
the categorical rule of just compensation to apply. In Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission, the Court held that a building permit conditioned on
the grant of an easement to the public to cross their beachfront property
64constituted a taking requiring just compensation. Because the conveyance
of the easement was an exaction in exchange for a land-use permit rather
than a mandatory conveyance, the Court engaged an additional inquiry in
reaching its conclusion, but noted that had the Commission required the
easement outright, a taking would have occurred. 65 Though ultimately
decided on exaction grounds, the Court considered the permanent and
continuous right of any individual to pass over the property at any time to
amount to a physical occupation.66
B. Regulation resulting in a partial non-physical taking
The leading case involving partial regulatory takings is Penn Central
67Transportation Co. v. New York City, decided in 1978. The dispute in Penn
Central involved the application of New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law to Grand Central Terminal. Grand Central had been
designated a historic landmark under the statute, resulting in restrictions
placed on Penn Central's use of the terminal.68 The company applied to the
Landmarks Preservation Committee for permission to construct an office
69tower on top of the terminal and was denied. Penn Central brought suit in
state court alleging that the Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to
Grand Central took its property without just compensation in violation of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The company argued that even though
the terminal, without the office tower, was generating a reasonable
investment return, the city took its property interest in the valuable airspace
63. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 1002.
64. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
65. Id. at 834.
66. Id. at 832. See also United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265 (1946) (holding
that easement for flight of government planes is an appropriation of the use of land "so
immediate and direct as to subtract from the owner's full enjoyment of the property and
to limit his exploitation of it").
67. 438 U.S. 104(1978).
68. Id. at 115.
69. Id. at 116-17.
70. Id. at 119.
Fall 2005] Restaurants, Bars, and Workplaces, Lend Me Your Air
above the terminal without just compensation for the fair market value of
those air rights by rejecting its application to build the tower.7
The Court rejected Penn Central's claim that just compensation was owed
merely because the company was unable to exploit a valuable property
interest previously thought available for development. Penn Central argued
that its use and exploitation of air rights was inexorably tied to its reasonable
investment-backed expectations in the terminal, and the statute interfered
with these expectations.73 The Court rejected this contention, looking instead
to both the character of the governmental action as related to the promotion
of the general welfare and the "nature and extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole. 74 The Court dismissed diminution in value
of a parcel as an allowable justification to find a compensable taking and
focused instead on Grand Central's remaining available uses.75 The Court
71. Id. at 130.
72. Id. ("'Taking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment have been
entirely abrogated").
73. Id. The Court noted that the landmark designation did not prevent Penn Central
from using Grand Central in the way it had been used since its inception, as a train
terminal with office space and concessions. This, said the Court, was the main
investment-backed expectation of the parcel, from which Penn Central continually
derived profits. Id. at 136.
74. Id. at 130-31 (defining the relevant parcel for purposes of takings analysis has
proven a controversial and vexing issue). Professor Margaret Radin coined the term
"conceptual severance" and the strategy therein-"delineating a property interest
consisting of just what the government action has removed from the owner, and then
asserting that that particular whole thing has been permanently taken." Margaret Jane
Radin, The Liberal Conception of Property: Cross Currents in the Jurisprudence of
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1667, 1676 (1988). While at odds with the majority's
instruction in Penn Central, it does seem that conceptual severance has gained somewhat
of a foothold in certain situations. Justice Rehnquist relied on it in his Penn Central
dissent, and while not explicit in the opinions, Nollan and Loretto are technically
examples of conceptual severance. Id. at 1676-77. There is a limitation here, however, as
judicial acceptance of conceptual severance seems forthcoming only where affirmative
easements or servitudes are concerned. (The servitude in Penn Central was negative). Id.
at 1678-79. This goes back to the Blackstonian conception of "right to exclude." In one
other example of conceptual severance, the Court held that a regulation extinguishing the
right of Indian tribal members to devise property to their heirs amounted to a
compensable taking. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). The Court found the character
of the regulation "extraordinary" and noted that it abrogated a right attaching to property
enjoyed since feudal times. While States can modify descent and devise rules for classes
of property, complete abrogation of those rights amounts to a taking. Id. at 717-18.
75. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131. The Court also noted that Penn Central did not
petition the Landmarks Preservation Commission for permission to build a smaller
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also noted that the statute allowed for airspace rights to be transferred to
other parcels owned by the company in other areas of the city, seriously
undercutting Penn Central's assertion that the regulation frustrated its
reasonable investment-backed expectations.7 6
Penn Central thus devised a three-pronged balancing test to determine
whether a regulation operates as a compensable taking. The first prong
assesses the economic impact of the regulation on the landowner. The
second prong addresses its interference with distinct and reasonable
investment-backed expectations. The final prong looks to the character of
the governmental action.77 Deference and presumptive validity are the
hallmarks of the Penn Central framework.
C. Regulation resulting in a total non-physical taking
In 1992, the Court adopted another categorical rule relating to regulations
that deprive the owner of all economically viable use of his property-an
admittedly "extraordinary circumstance ' 78 called a "total" regulatory taking.
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,79 plaintiff Lucas owned two
parcels of beachfront property that required no permit in advance of
development activity at the time of purchase. Two years after purchasing the
lots for nearly one-million dollars, Lucas began developing single family
homes on the parcels. Soon thereafter, South Carolina passed the
Beachfront Management Act, provisions of which directly affected Lucas by
flatly prohibiting his development of the parcels by requiring them to remain
largely in their natural state. 81 Lucas sued the Coastal Council, contending
that the Act operated as an uncompensated taking and that any inquiry into
the legitimacy of police power objectives to promote the public welfare was
irrelevant since the regulation stripped the property of all economic viability
and value.
82
The Court seemingly equated this total deprivation of beneficial economic
use to a physical appropriation and noted that situations such as this "carry
structure atop the terminal, so in theory, the air rights above the structure were still open
to exploitation given an appropriate plan. Id. at 137.
76. Id at 137.
77. Leading Cases, 116 HARV. L. REV. 321, 327 (2002) (discussing preservation of
Penn Central).
78. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l. Planning Agency, 535 U.S.
302, 325 (2002).
79. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
80. Id. at 1006, 1008.
81. Id. at 1007.
82. Id. at 1009.
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with them a heightened risk that private property is being pressed into some
form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public harm."
83
The Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, held that when the owner "has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has
suffered a taking." 84 However, the Court did carve out one exception-there
is no compensable taking in cases where the owner has been deprived of all
economically beneficial use of the property if the use proscribed by the
regulation is not part of, or reasonably expected to be part of, the title to the
property to begin with.85 Whether a particular use inheres in the title is
determined by "examining the restrictions that background principles of the
State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership."
86
Post-Lucas, one unresolved issue was whether a regulation depriving a
property owner of all economically beneficial use of land for only a
temporary period of time must be analyzed under Penn Central or Lucas.
The Court recently held that the former controls. 87 Lucas is limited to those
situations where the deprivation of all economic use of the property is
permanent. A regulation that has only temporary effect cannot be considered
to deny all economically beneficial uses of property for all time and
therefore cannot properly be called total, when the property is considered as
a whole rather than in impermissible temporal segments.
88
83. Id. at 1018.
84. Id. at 1019 (emphasis in original).
85. Id. at 1027. The Court rejected South Carolina's contention that title is held
subject to the implied right of the State to eliminate all economically valuable use of land
pursuant to land-use measures. The total takings inquiry considers the degree of harm to
public lands and adjacent private property posed by the proposed proscribed activity, the
social value and suitability of the activity to the locale, and ease with which the harm can
be abated by the property owner or third parties. Id. at 1030-31.
86. Id. at 1029.
87. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002). In Tahoe-Sierra, a thirty-two month moratorium on development of land was
imposed by the Agency pending a study of the impact of a certain development near Lake
Tahoe. Landowners brought suit alleging violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment right to just compensation for depriving them of all economically viable use
of their land for the period of the moratorium. The Court held that the landowners could
not bring the case under the Lucas rubric by segregating the thirty-two month period and
instead ruled Penn Central to be controlling as this was at most a partial taking.
88. Id. at 33 1. An argument based on conceptual severance of the property or
temporal segments must fail because it ignores Penn Central's thesis that the parcel must
be considered as a whole.
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D. Exactions
The Takings Clause has also been applied in cases where the government
has conditioned a desired property usage on a dedication of a portion of the
property to some public use. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,
89
the Court held that a permit to build a house on beachfront land conditioned
on the owners' grant of an easement across their property to the public for
beach access constituted a compensable taking. 9The Court reiterated its
rule that land use regulations are not takings so long as they substantially
advance legitimate state interests and do not deprive the landowner of all
economically beneficial use of the property.9' Under this standard, the
Commission could have denied the permit outright since it had advanced a
legitimate state interest and the Nollan's property retained substantial
economic value. 92 The issue then was whether a regulation in the form of a
permit condition (rather than the permit denial) commanded the same
result. 93 The Court concluded that it did not. The Commission had identified
ends that would have been served by denial of the permit itself but its course
of action--electing to impose conditions on the permit rather than deny it-
failed to achieve the very ends it identified.94 When a regulation takes the
form of an exaction, there must be an "essential nexus"95 between the
legitimate state interest advanced and the means chosen to meet that end. A
requirement of an access easement to and from the beach across the Nollan's
property lacked any nexus with the goals set forth by the Commission that
would have supported the denial of a permit, namely, the prevention of
overcrowding, protection against the psychological barrier to use of the
beach a dwelling might create and the preservation of a sightline to the
ocean. 96 Absent an essential nexus, there was no valid use of the police
power and a compensable taking had occurred.
Because the lack of a nexus was so obvious in Nollan, the Court did not
address how close the means-end fit between the exaction and legitimate
state interest must be.97 In 1994, the Supreme Court reached this question in
89. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
90. Id. at 842.
91. Id. at 834.
92. Id. at 835.
93. Id. at 837.
94. Id. at 838-39.
95. Id at 837.
96. Id. at 835, 838-39.
97. Id. at 834. The Nollan essential nexus requirement and the Dolan rough
proportionality standard gave some bite to the formulation of "'substantially advancing a
legitimate governmental interest,' which had become indistinct from the reasonableness
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Dolan v. City of Tigard.98 In Dolan, the plaintiff sought to redevelop her
parcel to expand the square footage of her electrical appliance store and pave
a parking lot.99 The city conditioned her permit on her dedicating a portion
of her property to the city for improvement of a storm drainage system and a
pedestrian and bicycle path. 00 The Court found that the city's proffered
reasons for the dedication met the essential nexus test.101 Also, the Court
announced a new standard for the question left open in Nollan: there must be
a "rough proportionality" between the exaction required and the impact of
the proposed property use in question.1 2 The governmental authority must
"make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication
is related both in nature and extent to the impact" of the use.
The theoretical frameworks for takings analysis are diverse. Which
construct to employ in analyzing smokefree laws will depend on the
character and nature of the statute or regulation and its effect on the property
owner.
II. AN AS-APPLIED TAKINGS CHALLENGE TO SMOKEFREE LAWS
It is important to categorize smokefree laws' °4 properly because the
theoretical framework employed to analyze the takings question depends on
what the bans actually do. Physical occupation of or complete economic
viability deprivation of the property would be most advantageous for
restaurant and bar owners because they invoke categorical rules requiring
just compensation. However, smokefree laws do not fit fairly into either of
these categories. There is no physical occupation of a restaurant or bar with
an affirmative easement or servitude. Likewise, smoking bans do not deprive
restaurant and bar owners of all economically viable use of their
establishments.
or mere rational basis standards applied in other economic contexts." Kmiec, Defining
Takings, supra note 42, at 1003.
98. 512 U.S. 374 (1994).
99. Id. at 379.
100. Id.at379-80.
101. The City was interested in reducing traffic congestion and preventing flooding
along Fanno Creek, and Dolan's property sat within the 100-year floodplain. Id. at 387.
102. Id. at 391. The Court has subsequently stated that the "rough proportionality" test
is unique to exaction analysis and does not extend to standard regulatory takings analysis.
Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703 (1999).
103. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. The Court concluded that the city failed to carry its
burden in showing that a pubic greenway, as opposed to a private one, was needed. Id. at
393. It also failed to show that the increase in traffic generated by Dolan's development
was reasonably related to the exaction of a bike path and pedestrian easement. Id. at 395.
104. See supra note 9.
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This leaves the broad category of partial non-physical regulatory takings,
governed by Penn Central.10 This rubric represents much of the area under
the takings curve, applicable in situations where Lucas10 6 (total regulatory)
and Loretto10 7 (physical occupation) are not implicated. Smoking bans
neither deprive property owners of all beneficial economic use of their
establishments nor do they constitute physical occupations of private
property interests. Rather, the claim is that they cause a diminution in value
to property and interfere with the distinct and reasonable investment-backed
expectations of property owners,'0 8 notwithstanding the public health, safety
and welfare justifications put forth by the government--classic partial
takings claims under Penn Central. The property interest invaded is the right
of the owner to prevent total abdication of the air of the establishment to the
government.
Penn Central, however, is no friend of property owners due to the low-
level scrutiny and elusiveness of actual content embodied in the test.'
0 9
Property owners need a far better hook.
At first blush, smoking bans do not appear to be exactions, at least not like
the ones at issue in Nollan and Dolan. In those cases, permits to develop
were conditioned on a dedication of a portion of the parcel for public
purpose and a grant of a real property interest to the locality. In the context
of smokefree laws, there is no dedication as a condition on a permit in the
literal sense. However, if one considers a ban on smoking to be a condition
on continuing the desired use of the property as a restaurant or a bar, then
such ban may properly be characterized as an exaction." 0 From the moment
the regulation becomes effective, permission to be a bar or a restaurant is
essentially conditioned on the exaction of the air of the premises for a public
105. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
106. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
107. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
108. See infra note 144.
109. See John D. Echeverria Is the Penn Central Three-Factor Test Ready for
History's Dustbin?, 52 LAND USE & ZONING DIG. 3, (2000), http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/gelpi/papers/dustbin.htm. See also Timothy Sandefur, The Obstacle Course of the
Takings Clause, 52 THE FREEMAN: IDEAS ON LIBERTY (Jan. 2002),
http://www.fee.org/publications/the-freeman/article.asp?aid=3929.
110. Some courts have held that exactions need not be dedicatory-that is, involve a
transfer or appropriation of real property to the government-in nature in order to trigger a
Nollan/Dolan analysis. See, e.g., Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd.
Partnership, 135 S.W.3d 620, 639-40 (Tex. 2004). Further bolstering the view that actual
land appropriation is not required, some courts apply Nollan/Dolan scrutiny to the
imposition of impact fees as a condition on a desired use and in at least one case such an
analysis was directed by the Supreme Court itself. See Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911
P.2d 429, 433 (Cal. 1996).
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purpose. This theory is not unsupported. In United States v. Causby,"' the
Supreme Court addressed air rights above a parcel of land and held that a
landowner owns "as much of the space above the ground as he can occupy
or use in connection with the land."' 12 It is not implausible to maintain that
the property owner "owns" the air in his establishment, and the "economic
vitality" 1 3 of that air can be impaired. Smokefree laws do not permit him to
allow his patrons to "use" his air as a depository for secondhand smoke and
use is "'an essential attribute of ownership"'." 14 As such, restaurant and bar
smoking bans should be susceptible to the heightened scrutiny of a
Nollan/Dolan analysis." 1 5
A threshold matter is whether the nature of restaurants' 16 and bars' t 7 as
public accommodations alters the core takings analysis. No takings case is
directly on point with this issue.1 18 However, some rights generally attached
to the concept of property have been undercut with respect to owners of
Ill. 328 U.S. 256 (1946).
112. Id. at 264.
113. See WATERS, supra note 16.
114. Id. (quoting Lexington Fayette County Food and Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-
Fayette Urban County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Ky. 2004) (Graves, J., dissenting)).
115. While Nollan/Dolan clearly applies to permit conditions imposed on an
individualized basis in adjudicatory proceedings, it is less clear that heightened scrutiny
applies to conditions imposed legislatively and which apply to a broad class of property
owners. Smokefree laws fit into this latter category. There is a split of authority on this
issue and the Supreme Court has never held that Nollan/Dolan does not apply to
legislatively-imposed exactions. See Andrew W. Schwartz, The Application of
Nollan/Dolan Heightened Scrutiny to Legislative Regulations and "Unsuccessful
Exactions" (Oct. 1999), http://www.law.georgetown.edu/gelpi/conference/schwartz.htm.
See also Parking Ass'n. of Ga. Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 512 U.S. 1116 (1995)("[T]he
general applicability of the ordinance should not be relevant in a takings
analysis.")(Thomas, J. dissenting from denial of certiorari); John P. Seibels, Jr., Nollan &
Dolan: Exaction Packed Adventures and Takings Jurisprudence, 4 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 1,
22-23 (1995) (discussing the applicability of Nollan and Dolan to legislative
determinations).
116. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000ab-2 (2000).
117. See 42 U.S.C.S. § 2000ab-3 (2000). Bars have been held to be "places of
entertainment" and thus public accommodations. See, e.g., United States v. De Rosier,
473 F.2d 749, 751 (5th Cir. 1973).
118. In Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, the Court held that the Civil
Rights Act did not effect a taking of the Motel's property without just compensation. 379
U.S. 241, 261 (1964). However, the Court merely cited to prior case law and did not
discuss whether or not the takings analysis was any different in the public
accommodation context. Id.
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public accommodations, such as the absolute right to exclude. 119 Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), owners of public accommodations
must make their establishments accessible to patrons with disabilities.1
20
Public accommodation laws are, in essence, a customer bill of rights.
121
Admittedly, Title III of the ADA has been employed to protect nonsmokers
with documented sensitivity to tobacco smoke from exposure to secondhand
smoke.' 22 Still, the courts have not addressed squarely the public
accommodation issue in the context of Fifth Amendment takings. While
certain de minimis requirements must be met by public accommodation
owners, others reaching beyond that threshold may go too far as to amount
to compensable takings.
A. Challenging Smokefree Laws Under Penn Central
Under the tripartite Penn Central test, the focus of the inquiry is on the
character and nature of the governmental action; the economic impact of the
regulation on the landowner; and its interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 123 There are essentially two ways to argue
the case. First, one can attack the existence of a public use or purpose, thus
making any taking, even a compensable one, unconstitutional. Secondly, one
could argue the existence of the Penn Central elements and then claim a
right to just compensation. In this context, the latter is the better track: it is
beyond dispute that the proffered purpose of smokefree laws is to promote
the public health, safety and welfare of the citizens by protecting
nonsmokers from the harmful health consequences of secondhand smoke
exposure. 124 Taking heed of the Court's admonition that a justifying public
119. See, e.g., id., at 258 (holding that owner of motel serving interstate travelers
cannot exclude patrons on the basis of race).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A) (2000).
121. See PGA TOUR, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 692 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERS, supra note 6.
To prevail on an ADA claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate a documented sensitivity to
tobacco smoke (i.e., the disability) that "substantially limits one or more of the major life
activities of such individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2)(A) (2000). The ADA entitles all
individuals to the full and equal enjoyment of all public accommodations, 42 U.S.C.S. §
12182(a) (2000), and courts have held that bans on smoking might in the appropriate
circumstance be a reasonable modification to the premises in order to satisfy the mandate
of the ADA. See SMOKE-FREE ENVIRONMENTS LAW PROJECT, THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT AND SMOKING IN THE WORKPLACE (July 11, 2001), http://www.tcsg.org/
sfelp/adafactl_01 .pdf.
123. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
124. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 39-5501 (2004); DEL. CODE ANN. 16, § 2901
(2004); FLA. STAT. § 386.202 (West 2004).
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use is whatever the government determines pursuant to the exercise of its
legitimate police power,125 there is little benefit in attacking the public use
and purpose identified by the legislatures. The real question is whether this
action comes with a price tag.
Defining the character and nature of smokefree laws' 6 is political
exercise. For antismoking advocates, such laws are laudable achievements
serving society at large, classic exercises of police power that push all the
right constitutional buttons. First, they impose an affirmative duty on all
owners of affected establishments to prevent smoking on their premises, but
this duty is shared across the board by all affected establishments so the
burden of compliance is not on a single property owner. Secondly, while
they apply only to selected establishments, the laws are part of a•127
comprehensive effort to protect non-smokers from the damaging effects of
secondhand smoke exposure, amply documented by scientific evidence.'
28
• - 129
They are not discriminatory 1-all owners of like establishments are
affected by the laws-nor are they applied to only selected establishments
within a class. In essence, even though restaurants and bars might be spread
throughout a city rather than discrete parts of physical communities, they are
in effect a constructive community. The laws seek to eliminate a harm and
provide a substantial benefit to the public at large by protecting the health of
the community. 31 Furthermore, the regulations can benefit the owner of the
125. Haw. Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984).
126. For the purposes of discussion, it is assumed that the smokefree laws in issue
apply to restaurants and bars. The analysis might be different if a specific ban applied
only to restaurant establishments and not bars. For example, application of a restaurant-
only smokefree ordinance defining attached bars to be part of the restaurant to a
restaurant that is primarily operating as a bar after a certain hour of the evening may well
be discriminatory if surrounding establishments are all bona fide bars not captured by the
ordinance. See Yoo, supra note 15, at ID ("If the city adopts the ban, however, he
[Warren Bruno, restaurant owner] said he'll lose customers to competing bars. 'Late
night, we're a bar,' Bruno said. 'After II p.m. they want to smoke."').
127. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132.
128. See supra note 9.
129. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 132.
130. Such a scheme is in contrast to discriminatory spot zoning, wherein a parcel is
arbitrarily singled out for less favorable treatment than neighboring ones. See Id.
Smokefree laws contemplate a "comprehensive plan" for a particular class of
establishments "wherever they might be found." Id.
13 1. An additional, non-obvious benefit is found in reduced costs to taxpayers bearing
the medical burden of secondhand smoke-related deaths: "We all pay for these conditions
through higher insurance premiums and increased costs for public insurance programs
like Medicaid. To the extent the [New York] law reduces secondhand smoke exposure,
those needless costs will go down." Russell Sciandra, Law Protects Nonsmokers' Rights,
BUFFALO NEWS, Oct. 5, 2003, at H5.
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. XXII:143
establishment in a few ways. First, those who would not normally frequent a
smoke-filled environment may now patronize the establishment. Second, the
threat of potential lawsuits against restaurant and bar owners predicated on
employment discrimination, the ADA, negligence in failing to provide a safe
workplace, assault and battery, emotional distress and nuisance, among
others, would be reduced. 132 In short, smokefree laws substantially advance
legitimate state interests.1
33
From the perspective of the owners, there are interests just as compelling.
First, and most basic, owners want as little governmental intrusion as
possible into their use and enjoyment of their property. Second, owners have
an interest in making a profit and earning a living through the operation of
the establishment, a livelihood compromised by a law which places
government interests first and robs the property owner of the fundamental
choice to permit or prohibit smoking in furtherance of "the most efficient
use of the investment of his capital and labor." 134 Though smokefree laws
essentially "impair[] economic efficiency"' 135 and render the owner's
knowledge of the needs and wants of his clientele immaterial-reposing
such an assessment with the government sight unseen 36-Penn Central
places the government in a very strong position if its actions achieve
legitimate state interests, to the point that the interests of affected
landowners are presumptively subordinated unless all economically viable
use of the property is obliterated. 137 The character and nature of the laws
thus weigh heavily against property owners.
132. See AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERS, supra note
6.
133. See Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
134. See Lexington Fayette County Food and Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette
Urban County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2004) (Graves, J. dissenting).
135. Id. at 757.
136. Id. In his dissent, Justice Graves went on to state:
Since the owner is free to start a new business or close an existing business, he
should be able to determine - for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all -
whether to admit smokers, nonsmokers, or both. Customers or employees who
object may go elsewhere. They would not be relinquishing any right that they
ever possessed. By contrast, when a businessman is forced to effect an
unwanted smoking policy on his own property, the government is taking part of
his property by regulation.
Id. at 758. Justice Graves did not cite Penn Central or its progeny. The argument,
however, fits nicely into a Dolan/Nollan exaction analysis, but those cases were likewise
not cited.
137. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City,
438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978)).
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Focusing on the economic impact of smokefree laws and their interference
with distinct and reasonable investment-backed expectations are the only
plausible hopes for success under Penn Central. Almost all commentaries on
smokefree laws include some iteration of the chief complaint: smokefree
laws hurt business in a very real economic sense. In some cases, restaurant
and bar owners can provide hard proof that the laws are decimating
business 38 and in other cases, the complaints offer dire predictions of the
impact of the laws.
139
Business owners argue that smokefree laws impact their profits and in
some cases might force them out of business altogether. 14 Penn Central,
however, makes it clear that diminution in the value of the property alone is
not sufficient to establish a taking. 41 If the business remains afloat, it is a
stretch for the owner to claim that the law "has an unduly harsh impact,"
142
on his use of the property or causes it to lose economic viability. Even if the
138. See, e.g., Jacklin, supra note 15, at A 15.
139. See, e.g., Associated Press, Laramie Approves Smoking Ban, BILLINGS GAZETTE,
Sept. 8, 2004, http://www.billingsgazette.com/index.php?tl=l&display=rednews/2004/
09/08/build/wyoming/34-laramie-smokingban.inc ("Opponents believe the ban infringes
on business owners' rights and could cost the city tax money because customers will
more likely stay at home or travel outside the city to establishments where smoking is
allowed."); Anthony Cronin, Smoking Ban Suit to be Heard This Fall in Hartford, Conn.,
THE DAY, Jul. 27, 2004 ("[Attorney Jan] Trendowski said the exclusions for the various
private clubs and casinos is causing undue financial hardship for many bars, taverns and
restaurants statewide. 'A lot of places may go belly up', he said."); Tim Rowden,
Restaurant Owners Praise Accord on Smoking, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 20,
2004, at 01 ("[Restaurant owner Chris] Olsen... says smoking is part of the business. He
says smokers and their nonsmoking companions would leave even their favorite
restaurant if it banned smoking. 'If that wasn't the case, then nonsmoking restaurants
would outnumber smoking restaurants... [T]hey don't. They don't even come close."');
Jobs Will Go Up in Smoke With Statewide Smoking Ban, THE COLUMBIAN BASIN
HERALD, May 6, 2004, http://www.secondhandsmokesyou.com/news/news_050604_
columbian-basin-herald.php. Discussing adverse economic impact of Pierce County,
Washington smokefree law:
Taverns and restaurants in Pierce County are hemorrhaging jobs. . . [h]ealth
department officials say employers just need to hang on for a year or so until
non-smokers make up for lost business. A year? That's like telling a drowning
man, 'hey, I'll be back tomorrow to give you a hand'.. . [a]s one beleaguered
casino employee asked the health department officials, 'how many people have
to lose their cars and their jobs and their homes before you see that trying to
protect my health is endangering my livelihood?'
Id. But see infra note 150.
140. See Rowden, supra note 139.
141. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
142. Id. at 127.
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business fails due to the impact of the law, the parcel or the establishment
itself can presumably be used for other purposes that would be economically
viable.
There is a potential for smokefree laws to have an effect on the owner's
reasonable investment-backed expectations. Restaurant and bar owners enter
the hospitality business to make a living. They expect to purchase the
premises and not only recoup what they paid, but generate a return through
the operation of a successful venture. Ultimately the success of the venture
depends on what the owners put into the enterprise, the locale and
community conditions. Yet so long as the product appeals to a clientele and
the owner complies with those inevitable and accepted governmental
intrusions such as public accommodation laws, 143 liquor laws and building
codes, the owner expects to generate a reasonable return on his investment.
When the government intrudes beyond any property law conditions in place
at the start of the venture-intrusions not factored into the initial decision to
open the business and which may adversely affect economic realization-
there is no question that the government has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations. This is the situation in which many bar
and restaurant owners are finding themselves. Opening their establishments
with smoking permitted, they have now seen their smoking patrons
disappear and with them, a portion of their profits. 145 It would seem that full
143. See generally Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104
Stat. 327 (199); Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
144. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 1044-45.
145. The experiences of individual owners is of paramount importance for the claim
that smokefree laws work impermissible takings. Such evidence helps build a case in an
as-applied setting, which is really the only plausible way in which to attack smokefree
laws. A facial challenge would be much harder to make because it would have to be
shown that the law in question had an adverse economic impact across the board.
Economic impact studies going to this very question are legion, some of which have
tended to demonstrate no adverse economic impact on the owners of affected
establishments and some of which have. See, e.g., Benjamin C. Alamar & Stanton A.
Glantz, Smoke-Free Ordinances Increase Restaurant Profit and Value, 22 CONTEMP.
ECON. POL'Y 520 (2004), available at http://www.tobaccoscam.ucsf.edu/pdf/
SmokefreePremiumFinal.pdf (finding no adverse effect); Fabrizio McLaughlin &
Associates Inc., Impact of Smoking Bans on Smokers Dining Out Patterns Derived from
National Survey of Adult Smokers (Oct. 3, 1995), http://www.forces.org/evidence/
evid.htm (finding adverse effect); M. Scollo, et al., Review of the Quality of Studies on
the Economic Effects of Smoke-Free Policies on the Hospitality Industry, 12 TOBACCO
CONTROL 13 (Mar. 2003), available at http://tc.bmjjournals.com/cgi/reprint/12/l/13
(comparing different studies showing both adverse and non-adverse effects and
concluding those showing non-adverse effects were of higher quality); AMERICANS FOR
NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF SMOKEFREE LAWS: CASE STUDIES (Dec.
2004), http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/econcia.pdf; AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS'
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exploitation of the indoor air is thus tightly wound up with the owner's
investment-backed expectations. 146 But is the connection so intimate that its
removal destroys the investment-backed expectation completely?
That final consideration is what disqualifies Penn Central as a useful tool
for owners challenging smokefree laws. While analysis of the economic
impact and investment-backed expectation prongs may mitigate in favor of
restaurant and bar owners, they fail to tip the balance in their favor because
total diminution of value is not present. The few constitutional cases
predicated on the Takings Clause have been facial challenges failing on the
diminution issue.
In D.A.B.E., Inc. v. City of Toledo, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit rejected the claim of a consortium of restaurant, bar and
bowling alley owners alleging that the city's Clean Indoor Air Ordinance
effected a regulatory taking. 147 The consortium failed to prove that the
ordinance denied its members all economically beneficial use of their
properties, holding that the plaintiffs submission of affidavits testifying to
lost profits or fear of lost profits due to the regulation was insufficient to
sustain the claim.
1 48
Similarly, in City of Tucson v. Grezaffi, 149 the Court of Appeals of
Arizona rejected a takings challenge to Tucson's smokefree ordinance,
noting that depriving the owner of the most economically beneficial use of
the property and diminishing its value do not suffice to find a taking and
RIGHTS, ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDIES CIRCULATED BY THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY (Feb.
2004), http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/TIecon.pdf, Eli Sanders, Last Gasp (Jul. 14, 2004),
http://www.thestranger.com/2004-07-08/feature.html (quoting University of California at
San Francisco professor of medicine Stanton A. Glantz: "How many times do we have to
prove that the world is not flat before people stop saying, 'Well, the world wasn't flat in
California but maybe it will be flat in Seattle."'). Smokefree advocates point out that
every study that shows a negative impact has been funded either by the tobacco industry,
persons or organizations linked to it or have secured funding of unknown origin. They
also accuse the adverse impact studies of relying on subjective measures such as
predictions, perceptions, estimates or surveys rather than objective measures such as sales
data and taxable receipts. Those studies that show adverse impacts serve an important
role: they show the importance of the individual apart from objective criteria and the
population as a whole, which is the key to an as-applied challenge. As applied, takings
cases are highly fact-sensitive and general impact studies would be subordinate to an
individualized determination of the merits of the economic plight of the particular
plaintiff before the court.
146. See Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 131.
147. 393 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2005).
148. Id. at 695.
149. 23 P.3d 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
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emphasized that even a showing of some negative economic impact on the
owner's business would be insufficient.
150
Penn Central is often criticized as establishing a meaningless test with a
presumption of regulatory validity inconsistent with freedom of ownership,
and is now "outdated."''5 Yet, rational basis scrutiny remains the standard
for partial non-physical takings challenges despite the criticism. Professor
Kmiec has argued that Penn Central should be abrogated in favor of
applying the heightened scrutiny of Nollan/Dolan to all takings analyses,
153
but that has not occurred despite predictions to the contrary. M Instead, the
Court has actually reaffirmed Penn Central's continuing vitality' 55 while
denying the applicability of the Nollan/Dolan level of scrutiny outside of the
exaction setting.
However, if smokefree laws are characterized as exactions, however,
heightened scrutiny would apply and the burden shifts to the government to
demonstrate essential nexus and rough proportionality. Therein lies the best
hope to challenge the constitutionality of smoking bans as uncompensated
takings in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
B. Challenging Smokefree Laws Under Nollan/Dolan
The heightened judicial scrutiny employed in exaction cases is a potent
weapon for those challenging smokefree laws. This sword has remained
sheathed but it should be no longer.
5 7
150. Id. at 684.
151. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 995-96. Professor Kmiec views Penn
Central as an "ill-fitting" piece of the takings puzzle "perpetuat[ing] an overly deferential
standard of review" and "[m]asking a virtually insurmountable presumption of
constitutionality." Id. at 995. See generally Echeverria, supra note 109.
152. Richard A. Epstein, The Harms and Benefits of Nollan and Dolan, 15 N. Ill. U.
L. Rev. 479, 491 (1995) (commenting on the rational basis test: "if the lawyer for the
state can offer a bad reason with a straight face, then he or she wins. But if you smirk
before you finish, then you lose. Now I do not think that the facial muscles should be
used to set constitutional norms.").
153. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 1044.
154. See Epstein, supra note 152, at 491.
155. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l. Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302
(2002).
156. City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes At Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 702-03
(1999).
157. The author's research has failed to identify any smokefree law challenges
predicated on a Nollan/Dolan theory. While the plaintiff in City of Tucson v. Grezaff, 23
P.3d 675 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001), invoked Dolan, the claim was not based on Nollan/Dolan
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Smokefree laws do not operate as dedications in a literal sense, but they
take on the character of exactions because they operate by conditioning
permission to operate a bar or restaurant on the exaction of the air of the
property for a distinct public use and purpose. If restaurant or bar owners
wish to continue in their desired use of the establishments, they must accept
this condition or risk breaking the law.
158
Under Nollan, there must be an essential nexus between the stated
legitimate public purpose for the exaction and the exaction itself-there
must be at least some semblance of a means-end fit.1 5 9 Under Dolan, if the
nexus exists, there must be a rough proportionality between the exaction and
the impact and burden created by the desired property use. 160 As professor
Kmiec notes, Dolan supplies a causation requirement to the takings
analysis-the government has the burden of justifying its regulation and
showing "the need for this particular regulatory imposition on this particular
landowner."'
6 1
The essential nexus between regulatory means and ends is not well-
disputed in this situation. In exercising their police power, state and local
governments have determined that the scientific evidence documenting the
health effects of secondhand smoke exposure is a call to action to protect the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens by shielding them from harmful
environmental tobacco smoke. 162 To implement this goal, governments have
chosen to adopt smokefree laws that prohibit smoking in restaurants, bars
and workplaces-going to the root of the problem. There is a nexus between
the means and the ends.
The thrust of an attack on smokefree laws comes in Nollan's rough
proportionality test. Here, there is no presumptive validity of the regulation
as in Penn Central; the burden shifts to the government to show that the
exaction for clean indoor air "is related both in nature and extent" 163 to the
burden created by the proposed use of the establishment as a restaurant or a
bar. The owner of the establishment would of course need to demonstrate the
existence of a reasonable investment-backed expectation at the time of the
heightened scrutiny and the quote was to a general principle of takings law reiterated in
Dolan.
158. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Vogel, Business Owners Declare War on Smoking Ban,
NEWS TRIn., Dec. 27, 2003, http://www.citizenreviewonline.org/dec 2003/business.htm
("many [owners] plan to let their customers keep right on puffing... even though that
could bring fines on smokers and businesses. Violators also could lose various licenses
needed to stay open for business.").
159. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n., 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
160. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
161. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 1008.
162. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
163. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.
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investment and an interference with the same based on the subsequent
dedication of clean air.164 Once that showing is made, the government would
then need to demonstrate that
(1) the regulatory prohibition was not categorically off-limits to
the state... and (2)... that the prohibition of the intended use was
necessary to avoid substantial harm to the public or private lands
and resources, which harm outweighs the social value of the
intended use and cannot be avoided reasonably by other means.'65
The existence of alternative means to achieve the ends identified for
enactment of smoking bans is the gravamen of a business owner's case. The
government must identify the impact of the use of the establishment as a bar
or restaurant (presumably the creation and continuing existence of a
secondhand smoke environment being the main factor) and show why a one-
hundred percent smokefree dedication is necessary in the interest of
shielding the public from secondhand smoke. The prohibition on smoking
does eliminate a substantial public harm that arguably outweighs the social
value of "unfettered" restaurants and bars, but the public harm can be
addressed adequately and reasonably by alternative means. If the
government is to succeed on this point, it needs to demonstrate clearly why
alternative and less burdensome means fail to carry the day. In the same way
that the City of Tigard failed to demonstrate why a public rather than a• - •166
private easement was necessary in the interest of flood control and why a.. .. .. 167
bike path was necessary in the interests of offsetting additional traffic,
other governments may find it difficult to show why smokefree dedications
are the only reasonable means of avoiding the harm to the public from
secondhand smoke.
No cases to date have been litigated on this theory, but such a potent
weapon should not remain holstered. Nollan/Dolan analysis is the welcome
talisman for restaurant and bar owners. Rough proportionality could prove
difficult for the government to demonstrate. If it fails to make an adequate
showing, a taking will be found for which just compensation is due. This is
the price governments must pay to mandate complete smokefree
environments in restaurants and bars.168 Legitimate state interests
notwithstanding, smokefree dedications are hardly the sole means of
shielding the public from the health consequences of secondhand smoke.
164. Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 1044.
165. Id. at 1045 (emphasis supplied).
166. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 393.
167. Id. at 395.
168. Id. at 396 ("'A strong public desire to improve the public condition [will not]
warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change') (quoting Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,416 (1922)).
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There are less intrusive means of protecting the public and achieving
smokefree air.
III. ALTERNATIVE INITIATIVES TO PROTECT THE PUBLIC FROM SECONDHAND
SMOKE
A. Separate smoking area with separate ventilation
Restaurants and bars could permit smoking, provided smoking is confined
to its own enclosed room with a separate ventilation system so that the air of
the smoking section would not mix with the air in the non-smoking
section.' 69 Under this dual system, smoking patrons would be afforded the
opportunity to enjoy their vice without encroaching on the interests of
nonsmokers. The dual system is the best of both worlds because it allows a
smoking clientele and has potential to attract nonsmokers who would not
otherwise frequent the establishment. The economic burden on the business
owner would be limited to a one-time outlay to cover the cost of creating the
dual system and any incidental maintenance costs. In the long run, it would
enhance the quality and value of the business by allowing a diverse client
base to coexist without a clash of competing interests. Further, governments
could require that bar and restaurant owners assign only smoking employees
to smoking sections, or obtain consent from nonsmoking employees before
assigning them to work in smoking sections, subject to monetary penalties
for noncompliance.
Smokefree advocates have rejected the separate ventilation system
solution as inadequate to address the dangers of secondhand smoke
exposure. 170 While separate ventilation may not completely eradicate the
risk to nonsmokers, 17 1 it is certainly an improvement over no action at all
and strikes an appropriate balance between the state's legitimate interest in
protecting nonsmokers from secondhand smoke exposure and the rights of
169. Several states have taken the physical barrier/separate ventilation approach with
regard to smoking in public accommodations, whether restaurants and bars are included
or not. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-15A-6(b) (2004); IOWA CODE § 142B.2(3) (2003); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 21-4010(c) (2003); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.12605(1) (2004); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 44-95-40 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 15.2-2802(3) (2004).
170. See AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, VENTILATION AND AIR FILTRATION:
THE SCIENCE (July 2005), http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/ventilationfactsheet.pdf;
AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, DON'T BUY THE VENTILATION LIE (Nov. 2004),
http://www.no-smoke.org/pdf/ventilationlie.pdf; JAMES REPACE, CAN VENTILATION
CONTROL SECONDHAND SMOKE IN THE HOSPITALITY INDUSTRY (Jun. 2000),
http://www.dhs.ca.gov/tobacco/documents/FedOHSHAets.pdf.
171. REPACE, supra note 170.
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private property owners, a balance absent in a smokefree regime. One-
hundred percent smokefree laws represent an uncompromising and
burdensome extreme, while a separate ventilation regime represents
compromise serving competing interests.
There is an inevitable counterargument to this solution. Separate
ventilation laws would be just as mandatory as smokefree laws and would
come with a cost to owners, thus making them susceptible to a Nollan/Dolan
challenge as well. Why is this approach any better? This criticism ignores
one crucial difference: except for the smallest of businesses in terms of both
physical space and capital, the strength of the plaintiff owner's case would
be much weaker in this scenario than it would be under a complete
smokefree regime. This is the case simply because it would be harder to
demonstrate interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations
and overall adverse economic impact.172 A ventilation regime would require
a cash outlay to ensure the premises complies with the statute or regulation,
and costs associated with upkeep, but the overall effect of compliance would
be to enhance the value of the establishment by catering to diverse clientele.
Owners would suffer an affirmative cost in complying, but the benefits of
that cost would more clearly flow to them, whereas the benefits of
compliance with smokefree laws are less certain.
In the case of small businesses where either (1) the establishment is too
small in terms of space to make a separate ventilated area feasible or (2) the
owner simply does not have the required capital to build a separate area and
install ventilation, a Nollan/Dolan case remains viable for the owner and a
risk to the government. Because of this, a ventilation regime could provide
an exemption for any establishment the square footage of which is less than
a certain amount or upon proof by the owner of an economic hardship that
prevents it from installing separate ventilation.
In the former case, the exemption reflects that as a matter of policy, it is
more important to protect the public health, safety and welfare by focusing
on the bigger establishments that are frequented by a larger portion of the
population rather than the smaller ones frequented by fewer numbers. This is
a trade-off likely to be detested by antismoking advocates but again, they
must be willing to come to the table and compromise-so far they have not.
In order to assist capital-strapped owners who seek to comply with the
dual ventilation regime, the government could build a subsidy into the
statute. If such owners could demonstrate a hardship in accordance with
certain criteria, they would qualify for a subsidy, which would be applied
towards bringing the establishment into compliance with the regime.
172. See Kmiec, Defining Takings, supra note 42, at 1044-45; Penn Cent. Transp. Co.
v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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B. Incentive Schemes
In South Dakota v. Dole, the Supreme Court held that Congress was not
precluded from achieving indirectly though the spending power what it
could not constitutionally achieve through direct legislation. 173 While the
power at issue in the smokefree law context belongs to the state and its
municipalities, the Dole principle applies. Assuming a court held a
smokefree law to be unconstitutional as an impermissible taking, thus
precluding direct regulation absent the payment of just compensation (and
assuming the state elected to abandon legislation entirely rather than face the
potential of paying compensation to successful litigants), the state could still
achieve its goal indirectly through a system of incentives conferring special
benefits on those bar or restaurant owners who agree to go smokefree of
their own volition.
For example, favorable tax treatment could be afforded to those
businesses that go entirely smokefree or which provide separate enclosed
smoking areas with separate ventilation. Such an incentive allows the
business owner to continue to meet both investment-backed expectations and
the standard the government encourages. In contrast to a "positive" incentive
like a tax break, the government could provide "negative" incentives such as
increased tax burdens and stricter regulations with respect to alcohol permits
and consumption for establishments that permit smoking. The government
could also enact laws providing for enhanced damages in cases sounding in
tort imposing liability on owners of bars and restaurants for injuries arising
from secondhand smoke exposure. 174 Incentive schemes, whether positive or
negative, would be tailored to weigh heavily in favor of bar and restaurant
owners adopting voluntary smokefree policies. 
75
A counterargument to this approach is that while the decision to go
completely smokefree is in theory voluntary, the incentive system may be
structured in such a way as to be effectively coercive. This interpretation is
173. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987). Dole involved an attempt by
Congress to encourage the states to adopt a minimum drinking age of 21 (an age it could
not itself set under the Twenty First Amendment) by permitting the Secretary of
Transportation to reduce otherwise allocable federal highway funds to states that permit
persons under 21 to consume alcoholic beverages. The Supreme Court held this scheme
to be a valid use of the constitutional Spending Power.
174. Such tort cases would involve claims by restaurant and bar employees against
their employers. Tort theories advanced in this arena include: negligence for failure to
provide a safe workplace; assault and battery; emotional distress; and nuisance. See
AMERICANS FOR NONSMOKERS' RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERS, supra note 6.
175. The statutory provision at issue in Dole was obviously meant to weigh heavily in
favor of the states adopting 21 as the minimum drinking age, but the Court characterized
it as merely a "relatively mild encouragement." Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
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open to dispute.' 76 The economic burden on business owners under an
incentive regime differs from those in a complete smokefree regime because
the government is not affirmatively interfering with private property rights
by mandating compliance. 77 Rather, the government is leaving the owner
with a choice. 78 Whether the owner decides to reap a financial benefit by
going smokefree or risk a financial loss if he does not, he chooses his own
destiny. 79 That freedom of choice brings the incentive scheme into a
broader grant of state power to encourage particular action and lifts any
cloud of constitutional repugnancy.80
The incentive is also preferable because it takes individual circumstances
into account whereas a smokefree law applicable to all does not. An owner
might well decide that on balance, the monetary benefit of a tax break would
be outweighed by the income generated by his smoking establishment plus
the less favorable tax treatment he would face, and thus choose against going
smokefree. Likewise, a struggling business owner who would not otherwise
go smokefree might do so in order to reap the benefits of more favorable tax
treatment.
There is one situation, however, that merits a carved-out exception. It is
not hard to imagine a small business owner with an almost exclusively
smoking clientele who cannot afford less favorable tax treatment, yet at the
same time does not want to turn away his chief client base. The plight of
such an owner deserves sympathy and the incentive scheme should contain
an exception to allow him to continue operating a smoking bar without
facing the tax penalty. The government must be careful not to allow this
176. Id. at 211-12 ("But the enactment of such laws remains the prerogative of the
States not merely in theory but in fact.") (holding that conditioning grant of full federal
highway funds on adoption of minimum drinking age was not coercive against the
States). See also Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937) ("But to
hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless
difficulties") (holding that Social Security Act was not a weapon of coercion against the
States).
177. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-76 (1977):
There is a basic difference between direct state interference with a protected
activity and state encouragement of an alternative activity consonant with
legislative policy. Constitutional concerns are greatest when the State attempts
to impose its will by force of law; the State's power to encourage actions
deemed to be in the public interest is necessarily far broader.
Id.
178. See Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 552 (2001) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting difference between the direct effects of regulatory power compared to
the indirect effects of government subsidies).
179. Lexington Fayette County Food and Beverage Ass'n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban
County Gov't, 131 S.W.3d 745, 757 (Ky. 2004) (Graves, J., dissenting).
180. Maher, 432 U.S. at 476-77.
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carve-out to swallow the scheme, so it should be carefully drawn to extend
only to its intended beneficiaries. To claim the exemption, the owner would
need to have operated the establishment for a minimum number of years and
realized no more than a maximum yearly revenue as fixed by the statute. In
addition to meeting these requirements, the tax otherwise assessable on the
owner must exceed a certain percentage of revenue in order to claim the
exemption. Because the requirements are stringent, it is likely the exemption
would not be abused. Furthermore, such an exemption makes sense from a
policy perspective because the harm to the non-smoking public from the
business would be minimal-the owner's clientele are predominantly
smokers-and the lower revenue implies fewer patrons to protect, when
legislative energies are better focused elsewhere.
C. Smoking Licenses
A new trend in the movement against smokefree laws is the fight for
"smoking licenses", which provide an option those "willing to pay for the
privilege a way to get out from under a[n]. . .anti-smoking blanket."
1 81
Along the same line as incentive schemes, smoking licenses would place the
decision of whether or not to go smoke-free squarely in the hands of bar and
restaurant owners. Under such a system, owners would again make decisions
based on their individual circumstances after weighing the costs and benefits
of paying for the privilege of allowing smoking. The pricing of a license
could be based on an economic model, taking into account such factors as
square footage of the establishment, hours of operation, type of
establishment, average daily sales of liquor compared with other items, local
geographic market, air quality scores' 82 and similar measures. The
governmental goal behind licensing smoking in venues targeted by
smokefree laws could undoubtedly be to kill it altogether, but that decision
ultimately rests with business owners.
181. Fran Spielman, Restaurant Group to Fight City Smoking Ban, THE CHICAGO SUN
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2005, http://suntimes.com/output/news/cst-nws-smoke0l.html; see also
Michelle Ku, Lexington's Smoking Ban to Stand For Now, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER,
Sept. 21, 2005, http://www.kentucky.com/mld/kentucky/2005/09/2 1/news/local/
12699937.htm.
182. See Chad Lawhom, Smoking Ban Foes Appeal to City, LAWRENCE JOURNAL-
WORLD, Nov. 17, 2004, http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2004/nov/17/smoking ban-foes/.
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CONCLUSION
Government undoubtedly has the right, through the exercise of the police
power, to protect the health, safety and welfare of the public from the ill
effects of exposure to secondhand smoke by promoting clean indoor air.
Some states and municipalities have chosen to advance this legitimate state
interest by enacting one-hundred percent smokefree laws applicable to
hospitality establishments. Thanks to the heightened judicial scrutiny
supplied by the Supreme Court's Nollan and Dolan holdings, owners of bars
and restaurants affected by the laws should be able to bring viable claims
that these laws as applied to their establishments take their property without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Smokefree laws are means not justified by the regulatory ends. In an
industry already regulated by food and beverage control laws and health and
occupancy codes, smokefree laws go far beyond regulation incident to
public accommodation ownership, which goes with the territory, to
unnecessary and questionable governmental intrusion. Justice Holmes
recognized that governmental regulation could cross the line from a
legitimate exercise of the police power to a taking. 1 3 Here the line has been
crossed. The same police power ends can be achieved by alternative means,
such as separate ventilation regimes that lend proper balance to competing
interests, enhance property values and promote economic vibrancy, or
incentive schemes that leave the restaurant or bar owner a choice while
encouraging the creation of a smokefree environment.
183. See Pa. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
